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"'And he who eats of the Tzutzu flower shall know the perfect
high. For the rush comes on like a tidal wave ... hits like the
blazin' sun. And the high? It lasts forever, and the down don't
never come' ...
'Why, as long as the Tzutzu flower still blooms, hope still blooms
for me.' And with tears of joy in his sun-blind eyes, he slips the
guru a five, and crawls back down the mountainside, pursuing the
perfect high."
-Shel Silverstein, "The Perfect High"'
1. INTRODUCTION
2
Headlines like "An Alarming New Stimulant, Legal in Many States," 3
"Synthetic Marijuana Sent More Than 11,400 People to ER in 2010,,"
and "'Bath Salts': Evil Lurking at Your Corner Store" 4 have captivated
the public's attention since 2010. As a result, bath salts and synthetic
weed have become a growing concern for ordinary citizens, law
enforcement, as well as the medical community. But where did these
drugs come from, and why does law enforcement always seem to be a
step behind? Synthetic cathinones, popularly known as bath salts, and
synthetic cannabinoids, popularly known as synthetic weed, "Spice," and
"K2," are all recent manifestations of the designer drug/legal high
phenomenon. While these specific chemical substances are new, the race
to find new analogs or new synthetic forms of previously scheduled
substances can be dated back to 1970 when Title II of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, also known as the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) was passed into law.5
JWH-018, HU-210, and CP 47,497 are examples of synthetic
cannabinoids, and mephedrone, MDPV, methylone, and methedrone are
examples of synthetic cathinones. 6 The first report of synthetic

1. Shel Silverstein, The Perfect High, 26 PLAYBOY 93-96 (1979).
2. Abby Goodnough & Katie Zezima, An Alarming New Stimulant, Legal in Many States,
N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes. com/2011/07/17/us/i 7salts.html.
3. Michelle Castillo, Synthetic MarijuanaSent More Than 11,400 People to ER in 2010,
CBS NEWS (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.cbs news.com/news/synthetic-marijuana-sent-more-thanI 1400-people-to-er-in-20 10/.
4. Mehmet Oz, 'Bath Salts': Evil Lurking at Your Corner Store, TIME (May 29, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,2065249,00.html.
5. Audrey Redford, Don't Eat the Brown Acid: Induced Malnovation in Drug Markets,
REV. AUSTRIAN ECONS. (forthcoming 2016). Draft available online, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstrac id=264173 1.
6. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., SYNTHETIC DRUG THREATS (Jan. 13, 2015),
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cannabinoids in the United States was in December of 2008. 7 The
prevalence of synthetic cathinones known to law enforcement increased
drastically between 2010 and 2012.8 Amongst high school seniors,
synthetic cannabinoids were the second highest drug of abuse in 2012.'
In August and September of 2013 alone, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) documented that synthetic marijuana was
10 likely
Colorado.
in
hospital
the
to
people
221
responsible for sending
On October 15, 2015, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
in cooperation with other federal bureaus such as Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP),
wrapped up an investigation, "Project Synergy III," that lasted over a
year." On top of 151 arrests, over 3,000 kilograms of synthetic
cannabinoids, over 300 kilograms of synthetic cathinones, and over $15
million in cash and assets were seized. 12 These numbers are up from the
results of "Project Synergy I" which began in December 2012. 13 Project
Synergy I resulted in over 200 arrests, and almost 300 kilograms of
cannabinoids,
synthetic cathinones, over 1,200 kilograms of synthetic
14
seized.
were
assets
and
cash
in
million
and over $60
To deal with the problems associated with designer drugs, analogs,
and synthetic drugs, the federal government has passed a series of laws.
These laws will be addressed in depth in Section 3. The piece of
legislation that kicked off the designer drug evolution was the CSA,
which was passed in 1970. The CSA was amended in 1984 by the
Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act (CSPAA). The
Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement Act (CSAEA) was passed
in 1986, and the Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act (SDAPA) was
passed in 2012. Despite these extensive pieces of legislation that added
countless analogs and synthetic substances to the controlled substances
schedule, the DEA is still fighting an uphill battle to keep up with the new
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/ synthetic-drug-threats.aspx.
7. OFF. OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, SYNTHETIC DRUGS (A.K.A., K2, SPICE, BATH
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/ondcp-fact-sheets/synthetic-drugs-k2-spice-bathSALTS),
salts (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).

8. Schedules of Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of 10 Synthetic Cathinones
in Schedule 1, 79 Fed. Reg. 18 (proposed Jan. 28, 2014) (to be codified 21 CFR pt. 1308)
[hereinafter Schedules of Controlled Substances].
9. OFF. OFNAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, supra note 7.
10.

2013),
257/.

Assoc. Press, CDC: 221 Sickened By Synthetic Pot in Colorado,USA TODAY (Dec. 12,

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/12/synthetic-pot-colorado/4005

DEA PuB. AFF., ARRESTED IN DEA-LED INVESTIGATION OF SYNTHETIC DRUG RINGS
11.
(Oct. 15, 2015), available at http://www.dea.gov/divisionslhq/ 2015/hq 101515.shtmi.

12.

Id.

13. DEA PUB. AFF., DEA NEWS: HUGE SYNTHETC DRUG TAKEDOWN (May 7, 2014),
http://www.dea.gov/divisions/hq/2014/hq0507l4.shtml.
14. Id.
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substances created by drug producers. According to a press release issued
by the DEA on October 15, 2015:
[for the past several years, DEA has identified over 400 new
designer drugs in the United States-the vast majority of which
are manufactured in rogue labs in China and sold on the Internet
and in retail outlets such as smoke shops, gas station convenience
stores, and bodegas. Abuse of these psychoactive substances has
resulted in ever-increasing numbers of overdose incidents and
deaths. 15
Individual U.S. states have also passed a variety of different laws to
combat the growing synthetic drug problem. These laws span from
specific bans on specific chemical structures to general bans on
substances that lead to specific brain receptor activity to analogue laws
that make drugs that are similar to previously scheduled substances
illegal. 16
Many legal scholars have suggested that extending the purview of the
CSAEA and the SDAPA to give more power to the DEA and federal
government to combat these synthetic drugs is the only way to curb the
explosion in synthetic drug use. 17 However, many of these
recommendations fail to consider the incentives created by such changes
in the law.
This Article will articulate the unintended consequences created by
previous drug policies. It also shows, by bringing the economics of drug
prohibition to light in this ongoing debate, how past and current policies
as well as proposed policy extensions not only fail to acknowledge the
root of the synthetic drug phenomenon, but also put drug consumers in a
more precarious and dangerous position. These policies directly
incentivize the creation of new substances for the purposes of recreational
abuse, lead to increases in drug potency, and increase information
asymmetries between producers and consumers as more substances are
produced and sold under the same street names. Proponents of increased
prohibitionist policies cite public health concerns in their charge to fight
synthetic drugs through additional restrictions, but many of these
proposals could actually intensify the negative health outcomes
associated with synthetic drugs. Not only are synthetic and analog drug
policies failing to address the core of the legal high phenomenon, they
are simply "kicking the can" down the road while drug consumer health
becomes collateral damage. These suggested policies are, at best, more
15.

Id.

16.

NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., supra note 5.

17. 1 am referring to the articles by Cohen, Losoya, Sathappan, Kau, and Shaller that I
reference later in the Article.
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of the same. Unfortunately, at their worst, these extension proposals
could result in more dangerous drugs emerging on the market, resulting
in greater public health concerns, overdoses, and death.
In order to make this argument, I have structured this article in the
following way. Section 2 outlines the economic concepts of drug
prohibition that explain many of the unintended consequences of analog
and synthetic drug policy. This includes discussions on price increases as
a result of the costs of prohibition and substitute goods, potency and the
Alchian-Allen effect, and information asymmetries. Section 3 outlines
the history of the synthetic and analog drug phenomenon leading up to
the current state of these markets. Section 4 examines and critiques some
of the recent suggestions to expand legal restrictions for analog and
synthetic drug production. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG PROHIBITION

A. Price Increases and Substitute Goods
The U.S. War on Drugs is often referred to as a supply-side war. The
goal of prohibition policies is to eradicate the supply of the drug. 18 This
means that law enforcement efforts are directed towards limiting the
supply of drugs available.19 Such policies raise the cost for drug suppliers
to sell drugs on the black market. Avoiding law enforcement is an input
into the production of an illegal drug. In order to produce illegal drugs,
the suppliers have to avoid arrest. As such, there is a cost associated with
avoiding law enforcement or a price that suppliers must pay in order to
continue producing illegal drugs without being arrested.
Like any other input into the production of a good, if the input price
goes up, fewer units of the good can be produced for a given sum of
money. In economics, when input prices increase, we model this as a
decrease in supply because fewer units can be supplied at each level of
inputs. Put differently, when input prices increase, it costs more to
produce the same number of units. A decrease in supply, all else held
constant, leads to a decrease in the quantity of goods supplied on the
market and an increase in price. As resources are expended by drug
producers to avoid law enforcement, this results in higher prices in the
drug market. 20 Fighting a supply-side War on Drugs can be modeled as
simply increasing the cost of doing illegal business, thus shifting back the
supply of drugs, resulting in an increase in the market price of the drug
and a reduction in the quantity of the drug supplied, all else held constant.
18.
19.
20.

MARK THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROHIBITION

Id.
Id.

75 (1991).
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When the price of a good increases, there are spillover effects into the
markets for other goods. One specific example of this is what happens to
the demand for a good when the price of a close substitute changes. When
two goods are viewed as substitutes by the consumer, changes in relative
prices will drive the consumer to purchase more or less of each good.
Imagine that good X and good Y are substitutes. When the price of good
X increases, the consumer will buy fewer units of good X. Additionally,
the consumer will buy more units of good Y as they substitute away from
good X due to the price increase. The opposite is true for price decreases.
If the price of good X were to decrease, the consumer would buy fewer
units of Y and purchase more units of good X.
Now suppose good X and good Y are both synthetic cathinones.
Imagine that synthetic cathinone X is placed under temporary Schedule I
provisions, now making it illegal to produce synthetic cathinone X. This
drug's change in status from technically legal to illegal increases the cost
of producing synthetic cathinone X because now resources have to be
reallocated toward avoiding law enforcement, and as a result, the price of
synthetic cathinone X increases. Consumers will substitute away from
synthetic cathinone X due to the increase in price and will buy more of
synthetic cathinone Y. How much more synthetic cathinone Y will be
purchased depends on both the relative price changes in X and Y, as well
as how substitutable X and Y are in the mind of the consumer.
Producers also have the incentive to shift into the production of a
lower cost alternative, such as technically legal synthetic cathinone Y. If
the scarce resources used in the production of illegal synthetic cathinone
X can be reallocated to the production of legal synthetic cathinone Y with
limited cost of transition, producers have the incentive to lower their costs
by shifting into the production of synthetic cathinone Y since its
production does include the additional cost of avoiding law enforcement.
Not only do prohibitionist policies incentivize producers to move into
the market for existing unscheduled drugs, but these policies also
21
incentivize drug producers to create entirely new synthetic drugs.
Although consumers would prefer synthetic cathinone X, prohibition
policies decrease the profitability of that good because of the costs
expended to avoid law enforcement. However, illicit drug entrepreneurs
see profitability in creating a new synthetic cathinone Z that is necessarily
unscheduled and free of prohibition enforcement costs because it is new
and unknown to law enforcement. Even if Z is inferior to X on qualities
that consumers prefer, Z does not face the same costs due to the
prohibitionist policies, and can therefore still be profitable. The profits
these entrepreneurs collect on the sale of synthetic cathinone Z are only
21.

See id. at 82; see also ISRAEL KRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (Ist

ed. 1985) (discussing wholly superfluous discovery).
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made possible as a result of the prohibitionist policies, and absent these
policies, synthetic cathinone Z would not sustain on the market because
it would be unable to compete with the consumer-preferred synthetic
cathinone X.
The economics behind law enforcement avoidance as an input into the
production of illegal drugs and drugs as substitute goods shows us why
policies targeted at decreasing the amount of drugs sold through
increasing the price sometimes do not have the intended effects. Instead
of exiting the market for drugs entirely as a result of price increases, drug
consumers often switch over to different drugs that they view as
substitutes. While there is a reduction in the use of the specific drug
targeted by the prohibition efforts, overall drug use will remain
unchanged if consumers increase their use of a drug that was not targeted
by the prohibition efforts. One historical example of this is the increase
in heroin use as a result of importation bans on smoking opium in the
early twentieth century. When the price of smoking opium went up as a
result of the importation ban, many smoking opium users switched over
to another opiate with substitutable qualities. 22 Heroin was a suitable
substitute for many smoking opium users because it was inexpensive and
legal. 23
Furthermore, these prohibitionist policies and the subsequent costs
imposed on the supply of a scheduled substance create incentivizes for
suppliers to discover entirely new drugs that fall outside of the purview
of the costs of prohibition. Suppliers will find these new, unscheduled
drugs profitable until they are added to the scheduling classification.
Once these new drugs fall prey to the increased costs of avoiding law
enforcement as a result of being scheduled, a new cycle will begin again,
and drug entrepreneurs will find a new, unscheduled drug to sell, thus
signaling to policymakers that new laws need to be passed in order to deal
with the new drugs brought to market.2 4 This logic explains why new
analogs and synthetic cathinones and cannabinoids continue to pop up
22.

DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: A HISTORY OF OPIATE ADDICTION IN

AMERICA 93 (2d ed. 2001).
23. Id.

24.

This cycle is consistent with the dynamics of intervention theory established by Mises

and expanded upon by Hayek and Mises. See LUDWIG VON MISES, INTERVENTIONISM: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1 st ed. 1940); see also F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (I st ed. 1944);
see also SANFORD

IKEDA,

DYNAMICS

OF THE MIXED ECONOMY; TOWARD A THEORY OF

INTERVENTIONISM (1997). This theory states that when a government intervenes in a market,
market responses to the intervention will result in unintended consequences. Policymakers will
respond to these unintended consequences by passing additional laws to fix these problems. The
new interventions will create new unintended consequences, thus perpetuating the cycle. Redford
& Powell present an application of the dynamics of interventionism in early U.S. drug markets.
See, e.g., Audrey Redford & Benjamin Powell, Dynamics of Intervention in the War on Drugs:
The Build-Up to the HarrisonAct of 1914, 20 INDEPENDENT REV. 509-30 (2016).
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after previous strains are temporarily and permanently scheduled. This
will be discussed further in Section 3.
B. Potency & the Alchian-Allen Effect
Another important unintended consequence of increased drug
prohibition is the rise in potency of illegal drugs. This rise in potency is
the Alchian-Allen effect at work.25 When a constant cost is added to a
group of goods sold at different prices, this results in a change in relative
prices in which the higher priced good is relatively less expensive by
comparison. 26 As a result, more units of the higher priced good are
brought to the market and sold. If prohibition policies can be viewed as a
tax or an additional input cost to producers, the Alchian-Allen effect can
be used to explain why producers have the incentive to bring more potent
forms of a drug to market. After the CSA was passed, punishments for
violating the law were administered based on the schedule classification
of the substance in question and the amount of the substance involved in
the violation. As long as the drug in question tested positive as a
controlled substance, other than its schedule classification, only volume
mattered in the determination of punishment. As volume increases, the
punishment, or cost of violating the law, also increases. Detection risks
increase as volume increases because larger volumes are easier to spot by
law enforcement. As such, drug suppliers are faced with a tradeoff-they
want to minimize the risk of detection and the cost of possible
punishment, but in order to do that, they would have to sell fewer27units
of the drug, thus decreasing their revenue and overall profitability.
In order to circumvent this tradeoff, producers have a third option:
they can increase the potency of their drug. 28 By increasing the potency
of the drug they intend to sell, drug suppliers can earn the same revenue
for fewer units of the drug. As fewer units of the drug are sold, the risk
of detection, cost of avoiding law enforcement, and the cost of
punishment all decline. Prohibition policies lead to increases in drug
potency because they incentivize drug suppliers to find ways to avoid
detection and punishment. 29 As synthetic drug suppliers try to avoid the
costs associated with detection and punishment, more potent synthetic
drugs will persist in the market. For example, JWH-018, a synthetic
cannabinoid, is reported to be up to ten times stronger than delta-9-

25.

See ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS (1st ed. 1964).
26. THORNTON, supra note 18, at 93-94; Mark Thornton, The Potency of Illegal Drugs, 28
J. DRUG ISSUES 725 (1998).
27. THORNTON, supra note 18, at 96-97.

28.
29.

Id.
Id. at 93-94.
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tetrahydrocannabinol, THC, the active ingredient in marijuana. 30
We have seen evidence of the Alchian-Allen effect on potency in a
variety of drug and alcohol markets as a result of prohibition. During
alcohol prohibition, production efforts shifted away from beer and into
31
more potent forms of alcohol such as distilled spirits and fortified wine.
Deaths due to alcoholism increased as a result of prohibition. 32 Since
1970, marijuana potency has drastically increased.33 Crack cocaine
34
emerged as a more potent form of powder cocaine in the 1980s.
Synthetic opioids like fentanyl are being added to heroin to increase the
potency of the drug. 35 Such increases in potency have led to higher
incidents of accidental overdose and death.36 Many of these overdoses
are the result of heroin users being completely unaware of or 37having
limited information about the presence of fentanyl as an additive.
C. Information Asymmetries
In illegal markets, the enforcement of agreements and contracts
between drug suppliers and consumers is limited because the involved
parties cannot turn to legal enforcement mechanisms to facilitate
cooperation. 38 Because both parties are involved in illegal activity,
outreach to law enforcement would result in self-incrimination, and thus
nullifies the intended goal. 39 These conditions make it difficult for drug
consumers to verify the quality of the drugs they purchase. We also know
from George Akerlof's well-known work on information asymmetries
and the lemon market that sellers have more knowledge than buyers about

30. Lisa N. Sacco & Kristin Finklea, Synthetic Drugs: Overview and Issuesfor Congress,
CONG. RES. SERV. (Aug. 15, 2014), at 6, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42066.pdf
31. Mark Thornton, Alcohol Prohibition Was a Failure, CATO POL'Y ANALYsIS No. 157
(July 17, 1991), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-157.html?&sa=U&ei=K8jVM6vCIjg7QaE8I
HAAg&ved=OCE4Q9QEwCg&usg=AFQjCNEWne 1nuRO35153XigxdUxSad3Rjw.
32. Jeffrey A. Miron & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Alcohol ConsumptionDuring Prohibition,81 AM.
ECON. REV. 242 (1991).
33. Caleb Hellerman, Is Super Weed, Super Bad?, CNN (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.cnn.

com/20 !3/08/09/health/weed-potency-levels/.
34. COCAINE.ORG, CRACK COCAINE, http://cocaine.org/crack-cocaine/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2015).
35. Evan Perez et al., Ready, Access, Low Cost, Pill-Like High: Heroin's Rise and Fatal
Draw, CNN (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/02/us/heroin-use-rising/.

36.

Id.

37. Associated Press, New Law Targets Those Trafficking Fentanyl, WCVB5 (Aug. 17,
2015),
http://www.wcvb.com/health/state-to-announce-new-tool-to-fight-opioid-abuse/34754
720.
38. Jeffrey A. Miron & Jeffrey Zwiebel, The Economic Case Against Drug Prohibition,9
J. EcON. PERSPECTIVES 175, 178-79 (1995).

39.

Id. at 179.
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the products sold in the market. 40 Therefore, we would expect to see
larger information asymmetries in illegal markets than in legal markets
due to limited methods of verification and contract enforcement. In such
markets where information asymmetries are high, dishonesty can be
prevalent.4 ' In these scenarios, the cost of a supplier's dishonesty is lower
in illegal markets than in legal markets because consumers have limited
options to punish cheating suppliers, and thus, the cycle of suppliers
selling inferior or different products under the guise of high-quality
products continues.
The "counteracting institutions" that Akerlof outlines as possible
ways to get around issues of information asymmetries and quality
uncertainty are difficult, if not impossible, to establish in illegal
markets.42 Guarantees and licensing would be very difficult to implement
and enforce in an illegal market. Because illegal markets function outside
of the legal framework, legally enforcing such promises would be
impossible. Establishing name brands is also problematic in an illegal
market. There are ways in which illegal drug gangs try to use name brands
and packaging symbols to establish loyalty among consumers and to
convey to them where their product comes from.4 3 However, such
branding efforts increase the likelihood of detection if confiscated drugs
can be traced back to its supplier. Consequently, illegal drug suppliers
have very limited incentives to create methods by which their drugs can
be traced back to them, either by consumers or law enforcement.
Many different forms of synthetic cathinones are sold along with other
stimulants under the same street name. In the early 1980s, "ecstasy" was
exclusively referred to as 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine
,(MDMA).44 When MDMA was temporarily scheduled by the DEA
because of its similarities to a previously scheduled substance, 3,4methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA) and a third variant known as 3,4methylenedioxyethylamphetamine (MDEA) were created and sold to
bypass the legal technicality.45 MDEA, in addition to MIDMA, was sold
on the market under the street name "ecstasy." 46 The street name "Molly"

40. George Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970).
41. Id.at 495.
42. See Id.at 499-500.
43. Brian Palmer, Do Illicit
Drugs Usually Have Brand Names?, SLATE (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andjpolitics/
explainer/2012/10/lebronjames heroin do illegaldrugsusuallyhave brand-names_.html.
44. Alasdair J.M. Forsyth, Ecstasy and Illegal Drug Design a New Concept inDrug Use,
http://www.drugtext.org/Dance/party-drugs-clubbing/ecstasy-and-illegal-drug-design.html
(last
visited Oct. 17, 2015).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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also used to refer exclusively to pure MDMA.4 7 However, over the past
several years, various other synthetic drugs such as methylone, MDPV,
4-MEC, 4-MMC, pentedrone, and MePPP have been found in Molly
capsules. 48 In fact, as of 2013, "[t]he DEA says only 13% of the Molly
any
seized in New York state the last four years actually contained
' 49
MDMA, and even then it often was mixed with other drugs."
As a result of drug suppliers selling similar substances under the same
street name in order to circumvent the law and keep their customers, the
product quality and chemical structures for any given street name drug
increases in variance, leading to more uncertainty on the part of the
consumer about the specific nature of the substance he or she is
consuming. When coupled with the potency arguments from the previous
subsection, this can lead to serious problems, including overdose and
death. Due to the limited mechanisms of enforceable reputation-building
in illegal markets, accidental overdoses and poisoning will be more likely
in illegal markets than in legal markets. 50 A prime example of this is the
evolution of the drug fentanyl and its subsequent analogs during the
1980s. While "china white" and "fentanyl" initially referred only. to
fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance, by the end of the 1980s, over
seven different fentanyl analogs varying in potency from ten to 2000
times more potent than fentanyl were also sold under those street names.51
Between 1980 and 1988, over 110 overdoses were attributed to fentanyl
and fentanyl analogs. 52 In recent years, we have seen similar problems
related to bath salts. Individuals have died from overdose by taking too
to as "ecstasy," but that actually
much of a substance mistakenly referred
53
contained only synthetic cathinones.
As mentioned in this Part, many of the negative economic
consequences of recent synthetic drug markets are not new or original. In
fact, many of these consequences have been exacerbated by policy
attempts to rectify past errors stemming from the CSA and CSAEA.
Thus, in order to fully understand how these not-so-new market traits
came to manifest in the synthetic drug market, we must review the
changes in drug policy since 1970.
47.

Irina Aleksander, Molly: Pure, but Not So Simple, N.Y TIMES (June 21, 2013),

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/fashion/molly-pure-but-not-so-simple.html.
48. Drew Griffin et al., 9 Things Everyone Should Know About the Drug Molly, CNN (Nov.
23, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/22/health/9-things-molly-drug/.
49. Id.
50. Miron & Zwiebel, supra note 32, at 179.
51. Redford, supra note 5.
52. G.L. Henderson, Designer Drugs: Past History and Future Prospects, 33 J.FORENSIC
Sci. 569, 573 (1988).
53. "For example, a 24-year-old female died after ingesting two capsules of what she
believed to be "Ecstasy" but was subsequently confirmed to be a mixture of methylone and
butylone." See Schedules of Controlled Substances, supranote 8.
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III. REVIEW OF U.S. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES POLICY SINCE 1970
Several articles thoroughly explain the changes in U.S. drug policy
between 1970 and the present day.54 Rather than regurgitate what has
been mentioned elsewhere, this section will discuss the unintended
consequences of the CSA, the CSAEA, and the SDAPA, which have
created the foundation for the current synthetic drug market to emerge
and persist.
The CSA was passed in 1970 and created the scheduling mechanism
to which all controlled substances are subjected.5 5 The CSA created five
schedule classifications: Schedule I through Schedule V. 56 There are
three criteria which each controlled substance is subjected to and by
which each is scheduled accordingly: the lack of an accepted medicinal
use of the substance in the United States, the lack of accepted safety
standards for use without medical supervision, and the high potential for
addiction. 57 Schedule I is the most restrictive controlled substance
classification and includes drugs like heroin and marijuana. 58 Schedule II
substances are still very restrictive but have been accepted for medicinal
use in the United States. 59 As such, Schedule I and II substances are
lower schedule
punishments than
associated
with harsher
60
classifications.
Following the passage of the CSA, drug producers have had an
incentive to find entirely new or previously unscheduled drugs to avoid
punishment. As such, analogs of previously scheduled drugs emerged as
low-cost ways to avoid punishment. Over time, more analog versions of
drugs were sold under the same street name, increasing the number of
information asymmetries between supplier and consumer. As a result of
the CSA, the cost of law enforcement increased for the controlled
substances, causing the price of these controlled substances to increase
and leading customers to seek cheaper substitutes. As previously stated,
analogs, or drugs that are slightly modified versions of scheduled
substances, are close substitutes with many similarities to the parent drug.
54. See Gregory Kau, Flashback to the Federal Analog Act of 1986: Mixing Rules and
Standards in the Cauldron, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1077 (2008) for a thorough account of historical
context leading up to and resulting from the passage of the CSAEA. See also Clayton L. Smith,
The Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986: The Compromising of
Criminalization,16 AM. J. CRiM. L. 107 (1988).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2014).
56. Id.
57. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2014).
58. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2014).
59. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2) (2014); Hai K. Sathappan, Slaying the Synthetic Hydra:;
Drafting a ControlledSubstances Act that Effectively Captures Synthetic Drugs, I I OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. 827, 841-42 (2014).

60.

21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b) (2014).
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Designer drug analogs like the fentanyl-family were created to bypass the
prohibitive costs associated with selling the parent drug fentanyl, a
Schedule II
substance, and close substitutes like heroin, a Schedule I
61
substance.
Policymakers saw the unintended consequences of the CSA and the
incentives it created for drug producers to develop designer drugs. As a
result, the federal government modified the CSA in 1984 to allow for the
temporary scheduling of a substance if it posed "imminent hazards to
public safety." 6 2 Although this allowed the federal government to hasten
punishment for production of these new substances, it did not eliminate
the incentive for drug producers to find analogs of previously scheduled
substances and new, unscheduled substances to sell. To specifically
address the incentive to develop analogs, Congress passed the CSAEA in
1986. The CSAEA mandated that drugs that are 1) chemically similar to
Schedule I or II controlled substances, and 2) intended for human
consumption, will be treated as Schedule I substances for purposes of
punishment and future scheduling requirements. 63 In addition to these
two requirements, a federal prosecutor must prove either that ,the
substance has psychological effects similar to or greater than those of a
Schedule I or II controlled substance, or that the person in question
intended for the substance to have psychological effects similar
to or
64
greater than those of a Schedule I or II controlled substance.
By establishing Schedule I-level punishments associated with the
production of analogs, the CSAEA quickly disincentivized the
production of analogs that are chemically and psychologically similar to
Schedule I or I controlled substances and are intended for human
consumption. However, the law also raised several questions about-the
parameters of "similarity." There is no chemical or psychological
definition of "similar" that provides a strict dichotomy between
controlled substances and their analogs, and this led to significant
ambiguity in enforcing the law. 6 5 An additional unintended consequence
created by the CSAEA involves the requirement that the analog be
intended for human consumption. This technicality incentivized drug
suppliers to continue producing new analogs, to package these new drugs
with clear stamps that read "not for human consumption," and then to sell
61. Redford, supra note 5, at 16.
62. 21 U.S.C. § 811(h) (2014). See also Matthew Brian Probus, The Emergence and
Emergency ofDesigner Drugs: Subdelegation of the Power Temporarily to Schedule in Light of
United States v. Spain, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 257, 262 (1988).

63.

21 U.S.C. § 813 (2014).

64. 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(a) (2014); Joseph A. Cohen, The Highs of Tomorrow: Why New
Laws and Policies are Needed to Meet the Unique Challenges of Synthetic Drugs, 27 J.L. &
HEALTH 164, 175-76 (2014).
65. See Sathappan, supra note 59, at 835-40 (discussing thoroughly the legal definition of

an analog under the CSAEA).
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them to drug consumers. 66 Suppliers of bath salts 67also avoided this
technicality by labeling the bath salts as "plant food.",
Similar to the CSA, the CSAEA increased the cost associated with the
production of a specific group of drugs-analogs in this instance-but it
did not eliminate the incentive for drug suppliers to produce all drugs.
Even the costs of producing analogs were not prohibitively high, and
there were loopholes that drug suppliers could take to avoid punishment.
Absent these loopholes, the CSAEA increased the costs of producing
analogs, thereby increasing the price of analogs available on the market
and leading consumers to search for other substitute drugs. The increase
in production costs also incentivized drug producers to avoid legal
punishment by finding new drugs to produce that were sufficiently
different from previously scheduled substances. As a result, the CSAEA
did not significantly reduce the availability of illegal drugs; it simply
pushed producers and consumers into new drug markets. After 1986
through the 1990s, previously unscheduled drugs like cathinone,
6
ketamine, and GHB increased in use and were ultimately scheduled. 1
Cathinone, ketamine, and GHB have psychological effects similar to
those of previously scheduled substances, essentially making them
69
substitutes for these scheduled substances.
After the passage of the CSAEA, the incentives to discover new
modifications created by the CSA still persisted. The only difference was
that in order to avoid the restrictions created by the CSAEA, alterations
to the parent chemical needed to be sufficiently significant so that the new
drug would no longer be considered an analog of the scheduled substance.
In the 2000s, synthetic forms of previously scheduled substances that
were neither chemically similar nor labeled "not for human consumption"
emerged on the market. These drugs fell outside the purview of the
CSAEA restrictions. The most notable of these synthetic drugs included
synthetic cathinones (bath salts) and synthetic cannabinoids. Bath salts
are synthetic forms of cathinone, a drug that was added to the Schedule I
classification in 1993.7 o Synthetic cannabinoids, or synthetic marijuana,
are drugs that mimic the effects of THC, the main ingredient in
marijuana. 7 ' Marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance that was

66. Id. at 833; Zunny Losoya, Synthetic Drugs-Emergence,Legislation,and the Criminal
and Legal Aftermath of Broad Regulation, 66 SMU L. REV. 401, 408 (2013).
67. Jake Shaller, Notfor Bathing: Bath Salts and the New Menace of Synthetic Drugs, 16
J.HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 245, 259 (2013).
68. Redford, supra note 5, at 23; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY,
LISTS OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, SCHEDULING ACTIONS, REGULATED CHEMICALS 5, 8 (Jan.
2016), http://www.deadiversion.usdoj. gov/schedules/orangebook/orangebook.pdf.

69.

Redford, supra note 5, at 23-24.

70.
71.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 68.
Assoc. Press, supra note 10.
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written into the original CSA in 1970.72
Use of synthetic cathinones and synthetic cannabinoids grew
significantly in the late 2000s and early 2010s. 7 ' As a result, in 2011, the
DEA temporarily scheduled 5 synthetic cannabinoids and 3 synthetic
cathinone precursors. 74 Using data from the System to Retrieve
Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE), the DEA tracked reported
incidents of the ten most popular synthetic cathinones known in 2012. In
2010, there were only four reports related to this group of synthetic
cathinones. By 2011, the number of reports increased to 205, and by
2012, just over 1300 reports including these synthetic cathinones were
documented.75 Not only has the frequency of use increased among the
same synthetic drugs, but the variety of new synthetic drugs has increased
as well. Between 2009 and 2012, the number of new identified synthetic
cannabinoids and synthetic cathinones increased from 2 to 51 and 4 to
31, respectively.76 Between 2010 and 2011, the number of phone calls to
poison control centers
for cases involving synthetic marijuana increased
71
6959.
to
2906
from
In order to attack this synthetic drug problem head on, the SDAPA
was passed in 2012.78 The SDAPA permanently added 26 synthetic
cannabinoids and cathinones to the Schedule I classification. 79 These
newly scheduled substances include mephedrone and MDPV, two wellknown synthetic cathinones. 80 The SDAPA also increased the length of
time that a substance can temporarily remain under the Schedule I
classification from 18 months to 36 months. 81 Unfortunately, the SDAPA
did not succeed in stopping the production of all synthetic cathinones and
synthetic cannabinoids. Similar to the previous laws that added more
substances to the Schedule I classification, the SDAPA only succeeded
in changing the forms of drugs available in the market. We know that
drug producers responded to these incentives by bringing new synthetic
drugs to the market because 6 more synthetic drugs-3 synthetic
cannabinoids and 3 synthetic phenethylamines-were temporarily placed
in the Schedule I classification in 2013.82 In 2014, an additional 14
72. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (1970) (10) (2014).
73. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, supra note 7.
74. Id.
75.

Schedules of Controlled Substances, supra note 8.

76. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, supra note 7.
77. U.S. D.E.A. PUB. AFFAIRS, CONGRESS AGREES TO ADD 26 SYNTHETIC DRUGS TO
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION (ACT, June 19,
2012), http://www.dea.gov/pubs/pressrel/pr061912.htmi.
78. Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012, S. 126 Stat. 1130, 112th Cong. (2012).
79. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, supra note 7.
80. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., supra note 6.
81. U.S. D.E.A. PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 77.
82. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL'Y, supra note 7; Sacco & Finklea, supranote 30,
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synthetic drugs-4 synthetic cannabinoids and 10 synthetic cathinoneswere temporarily scheduled.83
From this evidence, we can clearly see that each attempt to add new
drugs to the controlled substances list only succeeded in deterring drug
producers from continuing to manufacture those specific substances.
Instead of eliminating the incentive to produce any illicit drugs, these
scheduling additions only incentivized producers to find new forms of
synthetic cathinones and synthetic cannabinoids to produce and sell.
Furthermore, these additional substances that are brought to market are
sold under the general street names of "bath salts" and "synthetic
marijuana" respectively, thereby increasing the variance in products
available on the market and further distorting information asymmetries
that could lead synthetic drug consumers to health problems, overdose,
and even death. This raises the critical question of what, if any, policies
can be implemented to decrease the presence of synthetic drugs and their
negative health consequences.
IV. EXAMINATION

AND CRITIQUE OF RECENT POLICY SUGGESTIONS

Despite federal legislation since 1984 to eliminate the supply of
analog and synthetic drugs, the number of new synthetic drugs sold on
the market continues to climb. This has led many legal scholars to
investigate and write about new policy proposals they think will reverse
this trend. Unfortunately, many of these proposals, while creative, do not
adequately take into account the economic concepts explained in Part II.
Consequently, many of these policy suggestions, particularly those that
call for the extension of previous acts like the CSAEA and SDAPA, fail
to see how such extensions still incentivize drug producers to create and
sell new chemical structures of synthetic drugs that fall outside the
purview of the law. The recommendations that I will analyze and critique
fall into three categories: extending the scheduling authority of the FDA,
eliminating the CSAEA "human consumption" clause, and increasing the
proactivity of the DEA. The critiques that follow do not suggest that these
policy proposals would have no value. Instead, these critiques highlight
the lack of consideration for the economic forces outlined in Part II and
show that some of the proposals are unable to achieve their stated ends
because they do not address the incentives at play.

at4.
83.

Sacco & Finklea, supra note 30, at 4.
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A. Extending the Scheduling Authority of the DEA for
ControlledSubstances
One recommendation to increase the power of the CSAEA to better
deal with the growing synthetic drug problem is to increase the
scheduling authority of the DEA.84 One article in particular, written by
Joseph A. Cohen, suggests that the DEA should be granted immediate
scheduling authority in addition to its power to temporarily schedule
controlled substances. 85 Cohen argues that "[tihis immediate scheduling
authority would allow the DEA to schedule a substance that it believes to
be a dangerous synthetic drug without expending the time and resources
necessary to analyze the substance against the three factors required in
temporary scheduling." 86 If such authority were granted to the DEA, "the
DEA would simply use its authority to 87immediately schedule substances
it believes to be dangerous analogues."
Providing the DEA with the authority to permanently schedule new
substances would undoubtedly increase the number of synthetic
substances that are made illegal. However, this very extension of
authority incentivizes drug producers to create new synthetic drugs-that
will ultimately be added to the controlled substances list. As outlined in
Part II, one of the reasons that drug producers create new synthetic drugs
is because the cost of supplying the old drug increased. Adding a drug to
the controlled substances list increases the cost of producing that drug
because suppliers now run the risk of being caught for illegal activity and
they have to expend substantial resources to avoid being caught. As drugs
are added to the controlled substances list, the cost of producing those
drugs increases, and the incentive to create new substitutes also increases.
Allowing the DEA to make more synthetic drugs illegal at a fasterrate
does not eliminate the incentive for drug producers to find new synthetic
drugs to sell. In fact, allowing the DEA to schedule drugs more quickly
simply incentivizes drug producers to find new synthetic drugs to produce
even faster.
In the concluding remarks of Cohen's article, he states:
The effort to control synthetic drugs in America is not a fight that
can be "won" or "lost." These substances and their progeny will
likely be with us for the indefinite future. However, by prioritizing
the issue early and taking the steps discussed above, their

84.

See Cohen, supra note 64, at 179. See also Kau, supra note 54, at 1113.

85. Cohen, supra note 64, at 179.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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potentially devastating consequences can be limited."8
When we combine the problem of information asymmetries in drug
markets with the speed at which drugs will be scheduled and new drugs
will be created, it is unclear if the above recommendation does eliminate
the "potentially devastating consequences" of synthetic drugs. Insofar as
increasing the drug-scheduling speed leads to new drugs being produced
faster and being sold on the market, this places a higher burden on the
drug consumer to collect information about the flood of new products
available to him or her-often sold under the same street name-in a
market that is already wrought with information asymmetries. If drug
producers already have limited incentives and/or ability to meaningfully
articulate to consumers the differences between the old and new synthetic
drugs on the market, increasing the volume of products that needs to be
differentiated would only make this task more difficult. Furthermore, we
must not forget that in addition to finding new drugs to sell once previous
drugs have been scheduled, drug producers are also incentivized to
increase the potency of old and new drugs alike if they wish to continue
selling them illegally, in order to attempt to decrease the likelihood of
detection or cost of punishment if captured. Thus, increasing the speed at
which new drugs are scheduled could lead to worse health outcomes if
more synthetic drugs are brought to market and sold under the same street
name or drug category as the scheduled drug (such that the consumer
cannot immediately distinguish between the two). It could also lead to
higher variance in product quality, in product potency, and in the side
effects of these similar (yet still chemically different) substances.
Cohen's recommendation does contain provisions that allow for
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) veto power in the
event that the DEA hastily tries to schedule a substance that is a part of
ongoing medical research. 89 However, what about the possibility that
illicit drugs could prove to have some redeeming medical value long after
they are scheduled? Losoya sheds light on this very issue in a recent
article. She writes:
Many of these substances may have medical value or therapeutic
benefits, yet their indiscriminate criminalization will suppress any
opportunity for adequate scientific study. For example, MDMA
(commonly known as ecstasy), is currently a Schedule I drug, yet
studies have shown that the
drug has medical value in treating post90
traumatic stress disorder.

88.
89.
90.

Id. at 185.
Id. at 180.
Losoya, supra note 66, at 423.
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She continues later:
The fact that MDMA is a Schedule I drug, yet was found to have
medical benefits, at the very least raises the possibility that newly
banned analogues could likewise have medical treatment
without the
benefits-a possibility that could go undiscovered
91
studies.
scientific
chance of independent
In addition to the costs outlined in Section 2, there are additional costs
of scheduling that must be appropriately considered when recommending
policies that establish extensive power for the DEA to potentially stifle
possibilities of discovering positive effects of allegedly dangerous, yet
understudied, drugs.
Speaking to the similarities between more recent and past legislation,
as well as the shortcomings of sweeping legislation, Losoya concludes:
But history and science have shown that drugs-whether natural
or synthetic-have always posed complex issues for state and.
federal regulators, the legal community, and the public at large. ...Although rampant legislation might seemingly be a quick fix,
Congress and federal agencies should realize that it is an overused
ineffective and presents its own
strategy that has been historically
92
set of social and legal pitfalls.
Although her critical analysis of the legislation of controlled
substances does not directly address economic concerns, Losoya's
concerns are broadly consistent with the concerns I have raised
throughout this article. Such broad proposals for the legislation .and
regulation of controlled substances not only have the potential to
exacerbate problems created by previous laws, but such new proposals
and laws can also destroy other possible positive outcomes as well.
B. Eliminatingthe CSAEA "Human Consumption" Clause
Another policy change put forward with the intention of better
combating the growth of the synthetic drug market is the elimination of
the "human consumption" clause of the CSAEA. Sathappan, a proponent
of this change, states that "[r]emoving the 'human consumption'
requirement would have practical benefits-it would bolster the
Analogue Act's ability to combat the evil Congress intended it to, while
preserving a defendant's rights." 93 Because the CSAEA stipulated that in
91.

Id. at 424.

92.

Id. at 429.

93.

Sathappan, supra note 59, at 844.
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order for a drug to qualify as an analog of a controlled substance, it had
to be intended for human consumption, many synthetic drug producers
dodged this technicality by labeling their products "not for human
consumption."94 While there is no question that Sathappan is correct
when he states that the human consumption requirement "provides
loopholes for underground chemists, creates unnecessary investigatory
burdens for law enforcement, and adds to the cost of trials," 95 the removal
of this requirement will only increase the cost of producing the specific
synthetic drug in question once it is scheduled.
The loopholes and protections afforded by this clause only matter
once the analog has been identified by the DEA. The incentives to find
and develop new synthetic drugs and analogs will only increase if
suppliers cannot continue producing their initial drug under the protection
of this clause. Consequently, the cat-and-mouse game of the DEA trying
to keep up with analog and synthetic drug producers' new products will
only intensify as the costs of sticking with known analogs and synthetic
drugs increase because the producers can now be punished. Eliminating
the "human consumption" clause would do little to "combat the evil" of
synthetic drug markets because it would not eliminate the incentive for
drug producers to find new ways of fulfilling drug consumers' wants and
needs through the production and sale of new synthetic drugs.
As a secondary consequence, eliminating such loopholes would limit
our ability as analysts to understand the dynamics within synthetic drug
markets. A lot can be learned about the nature of analog and synthetic
drug markets in instances where these products are de-facto legal (i.e.,
technically not illegal) through loopholes like the human consumption
requirement and when these drugs are allowed to stay in the market over
time. Insights into consumer preferences could emerge under such a
scenario. Assuming that there are some margins on which competing
synthetic drugs are differentiable, and these drugs are not made
artificially scarce by the added costs associated with their scheduling, we
can see which drugs persist on the market and can make inferences about
the qualities of a drug that consumers are willing to pay for. Drugs that
stay on the market longer under these conditions will possess qualities
that are more desirable to the consumer than other substitutes. By
contrast, when a drug disappears from an entirely illegal market, it is
unclear if the drug disappears because the costs of enforcement were
prohibitively high or because consumers did not like the drug and were
unwilling to pay for it, thereby making it unprofitable to produce.
Imagine a market where drug producers and consumers are operating
in a space where artificial scarcity is present (because previously
94.
95.

Id. at 833.
Id. at 844.

STILL SEARCHING FOR THE IZUZU FLOWER

desirable drugs became unprofitable due to an increase in production
costs, not because consumers were initially unwilling to pay for them)
and the drugs sold are legal (e.g., an analog or synthetic drug market
without a human consumption clause) for a limited time until the DEA
identifies them. It is unclear if the drugs that would persist in such a
scenario would actually possess the qualities that consumers want, or if
they would persist simply because they would be the least terrible option
that has not yet been eliminated as the result of scheduling. Over time,
new drugs would emerge to fill the place of the previous drugs that
became too costly to produce as a result of prohibition. As such,
eliminating the "human consumption" clause will not decrease the
number of new synthetic drugs created. In fact, eliminating this loophole
could lead to even more synthetic drugs brought into the market to replace
the newly scheduled synthetic drugs and analogs.
C. Increasingthe Proactivityof the DEA
The other main policy recommendation mentioned in the literature to
better combat the analog and synthetic drug phenomenon as well as to
better enforce the CSAEA is to give the DEA greater opportunities to be
proactive. 96 Different legal scholars have suggested different methods by
which to increase the proactivity of the DEA. According to Kau, "Perhaps
the simplest solution is for the DEA to strengthen the use of rules by
petitioning for the official listing of potential chemical analogs on each
appropriate schedule instead of simply waiting for each chemical to
become a problem." 97 Kau continues, "Therefore, constructing a database
of potential analogs should be as simple as searching the scientific
literature for the appropriate structural backbone, along with
pharmacological search terms such as 'hallucinogen,' 'stimulant,' or
'depressant.' "' 98 Shaller, also citing Kau, likewise proposes such an
extension in the proactivity of the DEA.99 Shaller states:
In addition to testing the drugs that already have been created and
are being used, the DEA's chemists could attempt to identify
potential variations on already-prohibited drugs- variations that
would fit within the improved and streamlined definition of a
controlled substance analog.... By publishing a list of chemicals,

96. See Kau, supra note 54, at 1110; Sathappan, supra note 59, at 849; Shaller, supra note
67, at 269.
97. Kau, supra note 54, at 1110.
98. Id.
99. Shaller, supra note 67, at 266.
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the DEA would help allay due process concerns about notice.' 00
Scheduling analogs before they are seen on the market would be an
attempt by the DEA to outpace drug producers. However, it would not
eliminate the incentive for drug producers to try to find new analogs or
new synthetic drugs that are significantly different from previous analogs
to sell on the market. Once again, these specific substances that the DEA
uncovers would be prohibited and we would see fewer incentives for
producers to continue supplying those specific drugs, though producers
could still find legal, previously unscheduled substances to develop and
sell. This is consistent with the emergence of drugs like ketamine and
cathinone. There was an incentive, following the CSAEA, for drug
producers to cease production of analogs that could be punishable under
the law. Instead, they had incentives to find substances that were
unscheduled and significantly different from any substances already on
the schedule list. Cathinone and ketamine were unscheduled substances
that were not similar in chemical structure to previously controlled
substances. Once these new drugs were scheduled, producers had the
incentive to find, once again, a new substance to produce that was not
under the purview of the laws in place. Allowing the DEA to schedule
analogs and substances found in the scientific and medical literature will
increase the search costs for drug entrepreneurs trying to stay a step ahead
of the DEA. However, the incentives to find novel ways to deliver to
consumers a substance that can get them high are still ever present.
Another approach to extend the proactivity of the DEA, as proposed
by Sathappan, is for the federal government to follow the Rhode Island
approach and schedule general structural classes of drugs instead of just
the chemical structures of the specific substances.' 0 ' This
recommendation is closely related to the increases in scheduling
authority. Sathappan states:
The benefit of putting the structural class, as opposed to a specific
structure, though [sic] the scheduling process is that the DEA will
not have to research one specific substance at a time. By allowing
the DEA to research structural classes, its efforts can result in the
in existence and
banning of many dangerous substances, both
10 2
likely to come into existence, in one stroke.
Similar to the previous example, scheduling chemical classes will
increase the search costs for drug producers because they will have to
find substances substantially removed from the chemical classes of drugs
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Sathappan, supra note 59, at 847.
Id.
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on the market. However, the incentive to find new substances that fall
outside of legal punishment still exists.
V. CONCLUSION

The synthetic and analog drug phenomenon is a growing menace.
Instead of reducing the prevalence of synthetic drugs and analogs, many
scheduling policies fuel their growth by incentivizing drug producers to
avoid the costs of prohibition by finding new drugs to sell. By using some
of the key insights in the economics of drug prohibition to view the
history of and recommendations for future drug policy, we can see how
these unintended consequences have unfolded and will continue to
unfold. A primary concern should be the effect this evolution in synthetic
drugs will have on public health. As the number of synthetic drugs
available on the market grows, this increases problems of asymmetric
information. Consumers are worse off if they are unable to collect
information about the drugs they are consuming. These information
asymmetries also have secondary consequences to healthcare
professionals. Doctors are unable to keep up with the new forms of
synthetic drugs when it comes to patient treatment.' 03 "Since 2008, when
authorities first noted the presence of synthetic cannabinoids in 'legal
marijuana' products, periodic surges in overdoses have often coincided
with new releases, and emergency doctors have had to learn on the fly
how to treat them."' 1 4 Not only is the DEA having trouble keeping up
with scheduling all of the new synthetic drugs created, but health
professionals are having trouble keeping people alive and healthy as new
synthetic drugs are created. This puts drug consumers in a very unsafe
and precarious position. As more laws are passed to schedule synthetic
drugs, new synthetic drugs are developed and sold, and doctors are less
equipped to handle the negative side effects.
Many look to changes in future policy to fix these enforcement and
health problems. Some have gone as far as to recommend specific
policies that should be enacted to solve the synthetic drug problem.
However, a common theme among the three categories of policy
recommendations outlined in the previous section is that they fail to
address the incentive for synthetic drug producers to produce new
synthetic drugs solely for the purpose of avoiding the law. Therefore,
103. Abigail Hauslohner & Peter Hlermann, The Scariest Thing About Synthetic Drugs is
Everything That's Unknown, WASH. PosT (July 18, 2015), https:/www.washingtonpost.

com/local/dc-politics/why-synthetic-drugs-could-become-washingtons-next-drug-horror/20

15/0

7/18/32530cfc-2bc8- I1e5-a250-42bd812efcO9_story.html.
104. Steve Featherstone, Spike Nation, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 8, 2015), http://www.ny

times.com/2015/07/12/magazine/spike-nation.html.
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because the incentive to bring new products into the synthetic drug
market is driven by considerations beyond fulfilling consumer wants, as
long as there are any legal restrictions, this incentive to innovate to avoid
punishment will always be present. Current drug policy has a means-ends
problem. The means of implementing new legislation that schedules or
bans the production of drugs (regardless of how narrowly or broadly you
define the drug) to attain the ends of stopping the creation of new drugs
is impossible to reconcile. By implementing these means, policymakers
create incentives for the very behavior they are trying to eliminate,
thereby making the ends unattainable. As long as there is consumer
demand to get high or to feel euphoric, there will be a profit opportunity
for producers to create and sell goods that allow people to get high. These
goods might come in the form of alcohol, marijuana, heroin, crack,
methamphetamine, spice, MDPV, JWH-018, huffing spray paint,
jenkem, and the tzutzu flower. The goods that persist on the market will
depend upon consumer preferences as well as the institutional framework
within which the market operates. If the preferred alternatives for getting
high are made illegal, another good will pop up in its place in an attempt
to meet those needs. Policymakers would be hard-pressed to completely
stifle the market to get high. However, policymakers can make headway
in creating an institutional framework that helps to facilitate the sale of
the safest methods of fulfilling these needs. Unfortunately, it appears that
increasing the number of scheduled substances has had, and will continue
to have, the opposite effect.

